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Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch 
represents a series of brief analyses, 
written by local and foreign experts, 
dedicated to the most topical subjects 
related to the foreign policy of 
Moldova, major developments in the 
Black Sea Region, cooperation with 
international organizations and peace 
building activities in the region. It 
aims to create a common platform 
for discussion and to bring together 
experts, commentators, officials and 
diplomats who are concerned with the 
perspectives of European Integration 
of Moldova. It is also pertaining to 
offer to Moldova’s diplomats and 
analysts a valuable tribune for 
debating the most interesting and 
controversial points of view that could 
help Moldova to find its path to EU.    
T
he present territory of the Republic of Moldova was 
marked over time by Ukrainian policies and influences of 
various intensities which shaped, partly, the internal and 
external context of our country both in terms of identity 
and geopolitics. If we structure these influences, then the 
first one is forming over time, especially in the context of 
Russian imperial policies after 1812, of a large Ukrainian 
community on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, whose 
presence often conditioned the involvement of the Ukrainian factor 
in our history. The second was marked by the impact of Ukrainian 
policies, especially in the Soviet period, in shaping the current 
territorial and identity construction of the Republic of Moldova, 
particularly in the design of the MASSR in 1924, the MSSR in 1940 
and the Soviet-style “Moldovenism” after 1940. A third dimension 
of these policies is related to the post-independence perception 
of Ukraine of the Moldovan statehood both in terms of territorial 
and border configuration and the influence it exerted in time over 
the Transnistrian conflict. To all this is added the influence of 
geographic and implicitly political positioning of Ukraine between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova. And here we 
refer both to the evolution of Moldovan-Russian relations, and the 
determination of foreign policy guidelines of our country, particularly 
between the European integration and the Eurasian integration. 
All these influences have conferred a major role to the Ukrainian 
factor in determining Moldovan internal and external policies and 
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the political situation in Ukraine had and will always have a formative impact on Chisinau 
policies.
 This prompted us to offer a perspective on how the current situation in Ukrainian 
politics can influence policies in Chisinau and in particular Moldova’s European course. 
The key factors in this context are particularly the parliamentary elections in 2012, but 
also, by extension, all changes in Ukraine after coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych in 
2010. To understand these realities we will proceed with a brief historical review of the 
most important moments in relations between the two countries, and later, based on these 
assumptions to be able to highlight the current context and the likelihood of the future 
influences of the Ukrainian policies on the Republic of Moldova.
Historical context
The territorial enlargement of the Russian Empire was linked not only to the history of the Russian 
people but also to the historical destiny of Eastern Slavs in general, the three branches (Velykorussians, 
Malorussians and Belorussians) being considered part of the Russian people, and the imperial spaces 
colonization was a sustained effort of East Slavic colonization, whose nucleus were the Russians and 
Ukrainians. As the Russian historian P. Milyukov maintains, the imperial center did not prevent the 
Ukrainian colonization but, on the contrary, supported it because it did not distinguish between Ukrainians 
(Malorussians) and Russians (Velykorussians). One result of this colonization was the fact that the territories 
inhabited by Ukrainians increased twice in size and the current territory of Ukraine is mostly the result of 
this process. It is worthwhile remembering this because according to the imperial census, already in 1858, 
Bessarabia was inhabited by 120 thousand Ukrainians (13% of the province population) and, in 1897, the 
Ukrainians became the second constituent nationality of the province (380,000) or 20% of the population.
This reality explains why in the unstable context of the years 1917-1918 the Central Rada in Kiev 
laid claim to Bessarabia requiring its incorporation into Ukraine. Between the option of “Ukrainization” and 
the danger of “Bolshevization” the Romanian political class, on both sides of the Prut, chose the unification 
of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918.
The Soviet period is even more spectacular from this point of view, because as the American 
historian D. Laitin mentioned, the Ukrainians were a favored nation in the USSR with a direct access of elites 
to determining and shaping Soviet policies. The collaboration of the Ukrainians with the Russians, in those 
days, explains why the first were the main beneficiaries in terms of territorial extension (Western Ukraine, 
Bukovina, the South of Bessarabia, and Crimea). Thanks to this collaboration, in the context of discussions 
on the creation of the MASSR in 1924 triumphed “the Ukrainian line” by Grinstein, Badeev and Skrypnik 
that advocated for the “moldovenization” of the MASSR and not the line of the Romanian “kominternians” 
advocating for the “Romanization” of the future republic. Under the guidance of the Ukrainian Communists 
took place the “invention” of the “Moldovan language” in the MASSR and its export to Bessarabia after 
1940. No wonder that after the 1940 Soviet ultimatum, Bessarabia was claimed to Romania based on the 
Ukrainian majority character of the province, and the land of Hertsa, northern and southern Bessarabia were 
annexed to the Soviet Ukraine. Documents of the time show that N.S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the 
Ukrainian SSR, proposed to the CC of the CPSU that the MSSR to be created by unification “... just of the 
Moldovan population” and not by merging the territory of Bessarabia and that of the Moldovan ASSR, as 
originally planned in Moscow. After 1940, and especially after 1944, the Soviet Ukrainian legislation was 
extended over the MSSR while the Ukrainian Communists exercised some kind of protectorate over the 
Republic, being responsible for implementing Moscow policies in Bessarabia. Of the ten first secretaries 
of the MSSR eight were either Ukrainians or Moldovans born in Ukraine, while the Ukrainian political elite, 
as writes Ch King, alongside the Russian one, dominated in the MSSR in terms of political and economic 
power until the late 1980s. We may conclude that although part of the Soviet totalitarian system, the 
Ukrainian Communist lobby had a great influence on decisions in Moscow modeling the present Ukraine 
territorial boundary after the patterns of classical nationalism that will mark subsequently Kiev perception of 
its neighbors, including the Republic of Moldova.
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Post-independence projections
Part of the CIS and apparently placed in a neo-Soviet construction run by Moscow, in the post-Soviet 
times we notice numerous moments in relations between the two countries that witness about a historical 
continuity in the Ukraine policies towards the Moldovan state. On border issues, even if they signed an 
agreement on the delimitation already in 1999, the two countries have not completed the demarcation yet, 
among them there are many animosities caused by the exchange of territories in Giurgiulesti, Basarabeasca 
and Palanca areas (instead of 7 km of motorway in the Palanca area, Ukraine was to cede 100 m of land for 
the construction of the Giurgiulesti terminal on the Danube); still remains unfinished the border demarcation 
on northern areas - the plant in Novo Dnestrovsk, in the South - Giurgiulesti port region and in the eastern 
region of the Republic of Moldova of 452 km.
As for the Transnistrian issue the complicity of Ukrainians is well known both in its active phase, 
when the Ukrainian territory was strolled by all kinds of paramilitary armies or Cossacks and later by 
tolerating the economic axis Odessa-Tiraspol which allowed the separatist regime survival. Subsequently, 
in different circumstances (as it was in 2004), Ukraine decided unilaterally to modify the export and transit 
procedures at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. After charges of smuggling tolerance in the Transnistrian 
region, coming from the Republic of Moldova that was struggling to enclose economically the Tiraspol 
regime, Ukraine threatened, in 2004, that it will require economic compensation from the Republic of 
Moldova for losses caused by the economic blockade.
To this are added other litigations such as the energy problem, the plant in Novo-Dnestrovsk, 
properties issues (by the agreement of 2006, Ukraine recognized that Moldova had the ownership right only 
over 47 of the 108 entities on its territory), the issue of citizenship that Ukraine offers Moldovan citizens on 
both sides of the Dniester (Ukraine has a single citizenship and granting it automatically leads to the loss 
of the Moldovan citizenship). In addition, Ukraine is reluctant to the rapprochement between the Republic 
of Moldova and Romania, looks with nervousness at the tendencies of “Romanization” of the Republic of 
Moldova and supports the “moldovenism” in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, logical issues from the 
standpoint of the interests of Ukraine. The explicit enunciation of the Romanian character of the Republic of 
Moldova and a unity of interests of Chisinau and Bucharest, including in terms of integration of Transnistria 
are viewed with concern in Kiev from the perspective of increased pressures they would generate on its 
territorial integrity and identity.
Ukrainian elections stake in designing the 
European future of the Republic of Moldova
After a thorough analysis of the evolution of the Ukrainian policies towards the Republic of Moldova 
after 1991, we can notice that the only period when Ukraine had loyal policies, in accordance with the 
European patterns, towards the Republic of Moldova interests as a state, was that of 2004-2010, when 
occurred a change generated by the Orange Revolution, which stimulated a rapprochement to the European 
Union and NATO. Ukraine abandoned then the multi-vector policy and integration processes in the CIS, 
by choosing overtly to enter the Euro-Atlantic club, Kiev became a center of political gravity in the region, 
an alternative to Russia and supported by the West, Ukrainian diplomacy declared  clearly its interests in 
Transnistria and the Caucasus, aspiring to become a mediator between the EU and post-Soviet space. 
Moldova has fully felt the advantages of democratization and Europeanization of Ukraine after 
2004: the Transnistrian border dispute found a temporary solution through the involvement of the EU 
which intervenes in 2005 by establishing the Assistance Mission on the border between the two countries 
(EUBAM); Ukraine became an active mediator in the reformatted negotiation “5 plus 2” format; the Ukrainian 
President V. Yushchenko submitted in 2005 a plan for the Transnistrian conflict settlement (the Yushchenko 
plan), that will serve as reference to adopt a draft law on the basic provisions of the legal status for the left 
bank localities, and for those two appeals on the democratization and demilitarization of the region; the two 
countries have experienced a new dimension of cross-border cooperation by means of European funds, 
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particularly through the European projects for the Euro regions (such as “Lower Danube”) which provided 
a new framework for cooperation for the three states: Romania, Ukraine and Moldova.
After the return to power of the Party of Regions and victory of V. Yanukovych at the presidential 
elections in 2010, the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine was strongly distorted and the attempts 
of authorities in Kiev to convince Western partners about keeping the European integration direction are 
viewed with suspicion in Brussels. Restoring the Russian influence, a hasty signing of a treaty extending 
the Russian military stationing until 2045, restoration of authoritarian leading practices, restrictions on 
freedom of expression, intimidation of political opposition, even to the arrest of leaders, the use of state 
administrative resources and tools for securing political power, pressures on traders in order to determine 
the isolation of opposition political forces are just some of the manifestations of these changes produced 
after 2010.
 The short period of democratization and westernization of Ukraine and also the reversal of policies 
for a return to past practices of external orientation and internal modeling, demonstrate that our only chance 
of political survival is keeping the European integration course and continuing the process of internal reform. 
The Ukrainian lesson must show our political class and the Moldovan society what are the risks of the lack 
of responsibility when we talk about major changes in societies with low political culture and likely to be 
easily manipulated by Russia policies. On the other hand, for our country the outcome of the situation in 
Ukraine is very important, particularly as a result of the 2012 parliamentary elections, because a total return 
to Eurasian dimensions in Kiev will complicate the Republic of Moldova European course. Yushchenko 
period showed that a European, free and democratic Ukraine is the only chance for regional stability and 
containment of Russia increased pressure on European post-Soviet space, implicitly on the Republic of 
Moldova. The possibility of return of democratic forces to the Ukrainian parliament (Central Rada) following 
the 2012 elections is an important moment of reversal of Ukrainian policies and may be the beginning of 
resizing Ukraine’s European policy, a beginning of counteracting practices and policies initiated by the Party 
of Regions after 2010 and of breaking away from the Russian domination.
The past historical experience shows that maintaining Ukraine in the sphere of influence of 
Russia directly affects not only the Ukrainian domestic political context, by imitating authoritarian forms 
of leadership, but also influences directly, in a negative way, as we have seen before, Ukraine foreign 
practices and attitudes. Only in a European context marked by the principles of historical reconciliation, 
spiritualization of borders, functionality of international and national laws with respect for the independence 
and sovereignty of member states, the Republic of Moldova may have normal relations with Ukraine, which 
would be based on respect for mutual interests. In any other circumstances, the future of these relations will 
be marked by uncertainty and major risks for our state, both in terms of internal development and general 
regional context.
